Alex Miller (Otago): "Rule-Following, Meaning and Primitive Normativity"

In “Inside and Outside Language: Stroud’s Non-Reductionism about Meaning” (2011), “Primitive Normativity and Skepticism about Rules” (2011) and”Meaning, Understanding and Normativity” (2012), Hannah Ginsborg develops what she describes as a “partially reductionist” account of meaning. Ginsborg’s account is intended as a middle-ground alternative to non-reductionism about meaning and the kind of reductive dispositionalism attacked in Kripke’s *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*. In this seminar I will attempt a critical evaluation of Ginsborg’s fascinating proposal.

Date & time

Thu 11 May 2017, 3:30pm to 5:30pm

Location

Coombs Seminar Room A

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