I present an overview of my project on doxastic states. I also discuss three specific papers in more detail, and their contribution to the overall project. One paper is a problem-making paper for phenomenal intentionality theories. Resolving this problem in a coherent way is a topic of ongoing work in my project. In another paper, I address the question: what makes delusional doxastic states pathological? The standard answers all have flaws, so I set out to show “what really makes delusions pathological”. I present five ways that delusions can be pathological, and put these to work in addressing some of the confusion that has surrounded this question, both in the cognitive science literature and the philosophical literature. Finally, I present “an interventionist analysis of delusion formation”. I discuss just one of the important upshots of this work: it looks as though some of the more interesting and substantive debates between competing theories of delusions are sometimes obscured by confusions regarding the notion of a causal “factor”.