paperback. Overall, Künne's book constitutes a useful and substantial addition to the existing literature on truth.

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This study of dispositions has ten chapters. In chapters one and two, Mumford sets out the issues, showing that the notion of a disposition has wide application in many areas of philosophy. In chapters three and four, he defends an account of the dispositional/categorical distinction wherein it is construed as one between two types of concept or expression rather than between two types of property: dispositional expressions a priori entail various conditionals, categorical expressions do not. In chapters five to eight, he rejects the view that there is a corresponding distinction between two types of property, and argues for a version of what is described as monism, according to which all properties are dispositional. In chapter nine, he presents a so-called functional theory of dispositions, and in the last chapter presents an account of laws of nature.

Overall, Mumford’s view is that dispositional expressions such as ‘solubility’ are equivalent to expressions such as ‘the property that causes such and such’ with the added twist that the property denoted by such expressions is itself a dispositional property. His defence of this view is impressive in its scholarship, and straightforward in its organization. The expression is in general clear, but there are also a number of areas of sloppiness, which for me detracted from the whole. For example, in summarizing an argument about rigid designation, Mumford writes: ‘Dispositional predicates are rigid designators. There are possible worlds where they are not identical with their categorical bases therefore they are identical with their categorical bases in no world, including our own’ (p. 112). Some will baulk here at the suggestion that predicates can be designators, but to my mind the main problem is what Mumford means by ‘they’. On the surface he is saying that predicates are not identical to their categorical bases. But presumably this is not what he means.

Turning to issues of substance, here too I found myself with a number of unanswered questions. I will illustrate this by concentrating on Mumford’s discussion of the suggestion that dispositions are second-order properties, a view which has achieved considerable prominence in the literature on dispositions, in particular through the work of Elizabeth Prior (see Dispositions,

Second-order properties are, as Mumford says, 'properties of having properties' (p. 188). So, on the second-order view of dispositions, something is (say) soluble just in case it has the property of having some property that plays a certain causal role—for instance, causing whatever instantiates solubility to dissolve in water in certain circumstances. Mumford rejects this, and advances instead the view that dispositional properties are first-order: 'I understand both the dispositional and categorical as first-order and so on an ontological level-footing' (p. 189). What then is his reason for rejecting the second-order view? Mumford provides two arguments, one of which is contained in the following passage:

I think dispositions being second-order properties is counter-intuitive in the following way. Properties, including dispositional properties, are ascribed to things. Our basic ontological entity is the object, or a substance, to which properties are ascribed. With the [second-order] view, we are asked to accept the existence of second-order properties, which are properties of having properties and this is contrary to our ordinary concept of a disposition. We ascribe dispositions to objects, not to properties. (p. 189)

The structure of this argument is straightforward enough. From the premiss that dispositional properties are properties of objects, we are invited to conclude that the second-order view is 'contrary to our concept of a disposition', and so is false. Obviously the premiss is true, but why does the conclusion follow? In particular, why are second-order properties in the sense at issue not properties of objects? After all, the copy of *Dispositions* sent to me by *Mind* has the property of being blue, but it also has the property of having some property or other—for example, it has some colour property or other—and this last property is a second-order property. So here we have at least one object or substance, namely, my copy of *Dispositions*, instantiating a second-order property. The point is a simple one: how then can Mumford have missed it? The answer, I think, is that in this passage and elsewhere he is confusing the idea that a disposition is a property of properties, on the one hand, and the idea that it is a property of having a property on the other. Proponents of the second-order view have the second idea in mind, not the first. Being intrinsic (or being dispositional, for that matter) is a property of a property; but being soluble is, on the second-order view, a property of objects. It is just that it is a second-order property of objects.

The second argument that Mumford gives against the second-order view emerges at a number of different points in his presentation, and has to do with issues of causal impotence. In the course of defending the second-order view, Prior notoriously defends the idea that dispositions are causally impotent. Her main argument is familiar enough and proceeds as follows. If solubility is a second-order property of a sugar cube, then it is distinct from (that is, not
identical to) whatever first-order properties of the sugar cube cause it to dissolve. But then (the argument proceeds) it looks objectionable to say that the solubility also causes the sugar cube to dissolve. Like many philosophers, Mumford rejects the idea that dispositions are impotent; however—and this point so far as I know is original with him—he argues in addition that the thesis is inconsistent with the second-order view: 'How a causally impotent property can be classified according to its causal role is beyond the understanding of the present author ...' (p. 142). Indeed, for Mumford, the second-order view 'has the appearance of being self-defeating' (p. 116): in classifying dispositions as second-order it entails that that dispositions are causally impotent; and yet in classifying properties according to functional role, it entails that they are not.

One way to respond to this would be to question whether a property’s being second-order entails that it is impotent. To assess this requires a discussion of the highly controversial issues of exclusion and overdetermination much discussed in contemporary philosophy; this is not the place for that discussion. But in any case what is of more immediate interest is to assess Mumford’s own contribution to the issue, namely the claim that if a property is classified in terms of functional role this by itself is sufficient to deny that it is causally impotent. What reason is there for saying this? It is true of course that if you characterize a property by talking about its causal role, you contradict yourself if you go on to deny that the property has any causal role. But the proponent of the second-order view is not saying this. For consider again what it is to be a second-order property of the relevant sort: a second-order property—say, $F$—is the property of having some first-order property—say, $G$—that has a particular causal role. In this analysis, the property that is asserted to have a causal role is the first-order property, $G$. But this first-order property is distinct from (that is, not identical to) the second-order property, $F$. So, according to the analysis, $F$ is the property that has the causal role; $G$ is the property that is second-order. Since $G$ is distinct from $F$ it is not so far contradictory to deny $G$ any causal role. Nor is it so far contradictory to say in general that second-order properties are causally impotent. Of course, this is not to assert that it is true that second-order properties are causally impotent. Whether this is true depends on whether Prior’s argument for this conclusion is successful; I have already said how controversial this is. The point rather is that, contrary to Mumford’s understanding, there is no incoherence of the idea that second-order properties are causally impotent.

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