
Many existing causal decision theories do not correctly handle cases in which agents have information about the outcome of a chance process. Those causal decision theories—such as Lewis's—that deliver the correct verdicts in some such cases do so for the wrong reasons. Alexander Sandgreen adapts and deploys his Selective Causal Decision Theory (SDT)—a decision theory developed in his recent papers Determinism, Counterfactuals, and Decision (2021) and Law-Abiding Causal Decision Theory (2023)—to deliver the correct verdicts in the cases in question. Sandgreen argues that the SDT-based treatment of these cases is preferable to the approach proposed by Wlodek Rabinowicz and recently defended by Adam Bales.
Alexander Sandgren's primary research interests are metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of logic, philosophy of language, and decision theory.
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- Alexander Sandgreen
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- Nuhu Osman Attah