Francois Kammerer: “‘But it’s right there!’ Our sense of acquaintance with experiences and the meta-problem of consciousness"

Abstract: Solving the ‘meta-problem of consciousness’ (Chalmers) means explaining why we have certain problematic intuitions regarding consciousness. Amongst these intuitions arguably features a sense of acquaintance: we tend to think that our conscious experiences are presented to us in a way which is uniquely direct, concrete and perfect. We have the intuition that our experiences, unlike other things, are given to us; they are right there – under the mind’s eye. I argue that, of all our problematic intuitions, this sense of acquaintance is the most crucial and the most difficult to explain. I review and criticize some recent proposals which aim at explaining it (or similar epistemic intuitions regarding consciousness). I then present and defend my own view: our sense of acquaintance with experiences derives from a deep link between our introspection of experiences and our innate epipstemology.

Date & time

Thu 10 Oct 2019, 3:30pm to 5:30pm


Coombs Ext Rm 1.04


Francois Kammerer


School of Philosophy


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