Are there neural representations? This talk lays out traditional philosophical criteria for mental representations, and considers whether neuroimaging provides evidence of them. It briefly reviews previous work suggesting that FMRI, and in particular, Representational Similarity Analysis, provides suggestive evidence of neural representations, but falls short in only providing access to proxy vehicles.

Then it considers whether single-cell recordings do better, and finds that even when there is strong evidence for neural representational spaces, we are still confronted with vehicle indeterminacy. It ends by considering from a philosophy of science perspective what this analysis may indicate about the reality of neural representation.

Adina Roskies is a professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Santa Barbara. She is affiliated faculty with the Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences. She recieved a Ph.D. from the University of California San Diego in Neuroscience and Cognitive Science in 1995, a Ph.D. from MIT in Philosophy in 2004, and and M.S.L. from Yale Law in 2014. Prior to her work in philosophy, she held a postdoctoral fellowship in cognitive neuroimaging at Washington University with Steven Petersen and Marcus Raichle and was Senior Editor of the neuroscience journal Neuron. Dr Roskies' philosophical research interests lie at the intersection of philosophy and neuroscience, and include philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and ethics. 

She was a member of the McDonnell Project in Neurophilosophy, and the MacArthur Law and Neuroscience Project. Awards include the William James Prize and the Stanton Prize, awarded by the Society of Philosophy and Psychology, a Mellon New Directions Fellowship, and the Laurance S. Rockerfeller Visting Faculty Fellowship from the Princeton University Center for Human Values. She is coauthor of a book with Stephen Morse, A Primer on Criminal Law and Neuroscience.