There has been a serious accident in the broadcasting station of the football World Cup. Jones, our hapless colleague, is trapped under fallen electrical equipment. He is being agonisingly electrocuted and will die if we do not save him. The trouble is that the much-anticipated final match is being broadcast at this very minute. If we save Jones, we will interrupt the broadcast, disappointing countless football fans. Morally speaking, what should we do? Should we check the audience ratings before deciding? Some moral theories would tell us: ‘No! No matter how many football fans would be disappointed, we should save Jones.”

In general, these moral theories say that particular moral considerations (like Jones’s life) have overriding importance with respect to particular other considerations (like the contentment of football fans). I will call this commitment: Overriding Importance. Theories that subscribe to Overriding Importance are said to have a tough time dealing with cases of uncertainty. (Are we sure Jones is in trouble? Should we disrupt the broadcast just in case?). In this paper, I show – against arguments by Huemer (2010) and Jackson & Smith (2006 & 2014) – that such moral theories can offer acceptable prescriptions in cases of uncertainty.