Perhaps the most astonishing fact about intimidation is that, with one notable exception--Sandra Bartky’s essays on intimidation--there is no philosophical analysis of what intimidation is or how it differs from coercion. The most commonly discussed instances of intimidation--witness intimidation, voter intimidation, gang intimidation, racial intimidation, political intimidation, and intimidation in the context of domestic violence—are all ones where explicit or implied threats of serious harm are in play and thus where the distinction between coercion and intimidation is especially blurred. While these instances of intimidation may be paradigm cases of morally and legally worrisome intimidation, they are not obviously paradigm instances of intimidation, since we also use ‘intimidation’ and ‘being intimidated’ in reference to contexts where there are no explicit or implied threats, and indeed where there may be no intimidator.
There are thus two main questions before us. First, “What is intimidation?” An adequate answer should make clear how and to what extent intimidation differs from coercion. It should also provide an analysis that fits the full range of instances of intimidation, not simply a salient subset. Second, “In what does the badness or morally troubling nature of intimidation consist?”