Abstract: This paper raises objections to Compositional Nihilism, and attempts to identify a principled middle ground between Nihilism and Universalism.  I offer an interpretation of the argument for Nihilism according to which it is a “simplicity” or “redundancy” argument.  Nihilists commonly attempt to reconcile their view with common sense and science by appeal to plural predicates such as ‘are arranged F-wise’.  I argue that in many cases, the only available realistic understandings of these predicates themselves involve composition: being arranged F-wise = composing an F.  Such understandings are not available to Nihilism.  A fictionalist account is available, but I argue that this version of the view gives up on the redundancy argument.  On the fictionalist view, causal relations among composites are not replaced by causal relations among pluralities, but are simply relegated to the fiction.  If this is so, I suggest, composites are not really causally redundant in the sense that the redundancy argument requires: the only way to do without composite causes is also to eliminate their effects.  I argue, more tentatively, that this fictionalist view is a merely skeptical hypothesis.