Speaker: John Broome

Derek Parfit argues by means of something he calls a ‘continuum argument’ that a particular appealing premise in population axiology implies a conclusion that he and many other people find repugnant. He treats this as a paradox, and takes up the challenge of resolving it, looking for a way to avoid this Repugnant Conclusion. The solution he offers depends on the existence of imprecision within the relation of betterness among populations of people. Other philosophers have taken up the same challenge, following Parfit’s lead, and offered solutions also based on imprecision or incommensurability. I shall show that actually the Repugnant Conclusion is not implied by Parfit’s appealing premise. The continuum argument is invalid. There is therefore no paradox and no real challenge. Moreover, the explanation of why this is so has nothing to do with imprecision, incompleteness, incommensurability, indeterminacy or vagueness in betterness. It is consistent with a sharp, complete betterness ordering.

Please note that these seminars are open to the public and in person only.