Thesis: Moral Anti-Rationalism and Consequentialism
According to moral anti-rationalism, a person can have sufficient reason, all things considered, to act immorally. My thesis is a defence of this view, and a discussion of two connected issues. It has three parts. The first is an exploration of some of the considerations that can genuinely favour immoral actions. The second is a defence of moral anti-rationalism, which assumes certain claims I defend in part one. The third is an evaluation of the idea that the truth of moral anti-rationalism would vindicate agent-neutral forms of consequentialism.

Paper: Excellence-Based Reasons
Moral anti-rationalism doesn’t even get off the ground unless there are genuine non-moral reasons for action. In this talk, I discuss one kind of reason that I believe fits the bill. These are what I call excellence-based reasons. Roughly, these are reasons to achieve excellence in valuable activities. I first develop an account of excellence-based reasons. I then argue that excellence-based reasons are non-moral.