Can a very large number of instances of low (but positive) value outweigh a small number of instances of very high value? When faced with thought experiments like the Repugnant Conclusion and Life for Headaches, many of us have the strong intuition that they cannot: no number of headaches cured can outweigh the value of a life; no number of lives just above the neutral level can outweigh the value of a smaller number of flourishing lives. Several philosophers have argued that these ‘anti‑additive’ intuitions are unreliable because we are incapable of accurately imagining the large quantities involved in these cases: we simply can’t grasp the disvalue of a billion headaches. In this paper, I defend anti‑additive intuitions from the large numbers objection.  I argue that our intuitions do not involve imagining (or mis-imagining) large numbers at all, and so they are not undermined by our inability to properly grasp the size of very large numbers.