What does it take to give morally valid consent? Is it enough that the consenter forms a particular mental state or does one need to communicate (or perhaps attempt to communicate) the presence of that mental state? This question has received significant attention in the news recently, primarily in relation to consent to sex. Following a number of high profile cases of sexual harassment and sexual assault, a heated public debate was sparked in the media, with movements such as MeToo and Time’sUp calling, among other things, for new attention to the question of when someone can be said to have given valid consent to sex. I will suggest that to answer this question we need to consider why we value having the moral power to consent. There is an obvious connection between how the power operates and why we have the power to begin with, but this connection has been overlooked in the philosophical debate. I will try to make progress in articulating this connection by considering the role played by the consenter and by the recipient of consent in cases of morally valid consent. I will also explore the connection between this issue and some moves made in the philosophical debate on the justification of knowledge.