Various normative systems make use of duties. For example, there are moral duties, legal duties, epistemic duties, duties of etiquette, and institutional duties. In many of these normative systems the duties posited appear to come in two forms directed and undirected. A directed duty is a duty that is owed to (or directed at) a subject (e.g. a moral duty to keep a promise is owed by the promisor to the promisee). An undirected duty is a duty that is not owed to (or not directed at) anyone (e.g. your epistemic duty to infer ‘q’ from ‘p or q’ and ‘not p’). The distinction between directed and undirected duties appears to make intuitive sense. However, to fully understand the distinction and deal with problem cases where it is difficult to determine whether a duty is directed or not, it seems we need a theory of duty direction. Such a theory would analyse and explain the notion of a directed duty. In this talk I defend a theory of duty direction that I adapt from Joseph Raz’s theory of rights. I show how the Razian theory is superior to the four other leading candidates for a theory of duty direction as well as offering positive arguments to support it.