The dominant conception of indeterminacy can be summed up in two slogans: go
gappy; go non-classical. In more detail, the dominant conception has been that
indeterminacy is a type of incompleteness, and, moreover, that to make sense of
this incompleteness we must give up on the principle of bivalence. In recent
years, various alternative conceptions have emerged under which one, but not
both, of these slogans gets to be rejected. In contrast, the goal in this talk
is to develop and defend a model of indeterminacy under which both slogans are
given up in favour of a view whereby we: go glutty; stay classical. Hence, we
get to keep classical logic and classical semantics and yet represent (certain
kinds of) indeterminacy to issue in a type of glut. Moreover, it will be argued
that many exemplars of indeterminacy which have traditionally been characterised
as gappy (such as the problem of the Ship of Theseus, The Problem of the Many,
The Open Future, and more) should in fact be characterised as glutty.