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Centre for Consciousness

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Centre for Moral, Social and Political Theory

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HomeUpcoming EventsPeter Boltuc (Illinois Springfield): Non-Reductive Machine Consciousness -- How Naturalism Can Be Non-reductive
Peter Boltuc (Illinois Springfield): Non-Reductive Machine Consciousness -- how naturalism can be non-reductive

Part I The Engineering Thesis: Can a robot have non-reductive first person stream of consciousness? (1) If neuroscience learns how first-person consciousness is generated in human cognitive architecture, (2) we would know the exact engineering blueprint for generators of such consciousness, which (3) could in principle be engineered. (This argument is obviously true for reductive physicalism, but the human cognitive architecture approach helps us see how it applies to non-reductive physicalism as well). Part II What Non-Reductive Means (in this context): I use the human cognitive architecture approach to tackle the traditional defences of non-reductive consciousness such as the Knowledge Argument. Warning, rough zombies may show up. I finish with a controversial claim: Non-reductive consciousness is not about qualities of experience, or the level of intelligence, but about the stream of awareness. Internal objects of experience may someday be put on a computer screen if scientists (say, Tononi) become very good on solving the easy problem of consciousness. The hard-problem is not the problem of qualia, or other minds; it’s quite a bit harder.

Date & time

  • Thu 28 Aug 2014, 4:00 pm - 6:00 pm

Location

Coombs Seminar Room A

Event Series

Philosophy Departmental Seminars