Epistemic Error Theory denies that there are epistemic reasons. This theory stands accused of being self-undermining. To accept, assert, argue for, believe, deliberate about, hold that, etc. ‘there are no epistemic reasons’ supposedly implies that there are epistemic reasons; e.g. to argue, the objection maintains, just is to point out the epistemic reasons to believe something, so arguing for Epistemic Error Theory is inconsistent. In this talk, I argue that the Epistemic Error Theory is not self-undermining. Perhaps, I will also mention something about my PhD thesis.

Zoom: https://anu.zoom.us/j/84116782481?pwd=cGlZWmRwMFpQZXpqVGJwR2xRUnBIQT09

Meeting ID: 841 1678 2481
Password: 376732