In this talk, I aim to develop a rationale for the beneficiary pays principle. According to this principle, being a (innocent) beneficiary of significant harms inflicted by others may be sufficient to ground special duties to address the hardships suffered by the victims. Much of the literature on the beneficiary pays principle explores whether this principle makes intuitive sense of how we think we should allocate responsibility between agents in a range of cases, hypothetical and real.  By contrast, I defend beneficiary pays by arguing that a morality which incorporates the practice of allocating benefiting-related duties in ways that I will specify should, if the wide majority of people tried to internalise the practice, be expected to result in morally better consequences than a morality that does not. That is, I give a rule-consequentialist argument that benefiting-related duties should be allocated in what I call property-violation and motivational-cause cases. And I argue that the only reason why we should allocate these duties is because of the expected effects of this practice. I also demonstrate that rule-consequentialism can justify why beneficiaries should be allocated more stringent and demanding duties in some types of cases than in others. Lastly, I defend this rationale for beneficiary pays against some significant objections.