Speaker: Eleanor Gordon-Smith

In this paper I’m going to show how the moral and practical upshots of believing p could possibly weigh in deliberation about whether p, when at the moment it’s widely thought they can’t. Pragmatists and evidentialists alike have agreed that only evidence about p is psychologically able to feature in deliberation about whether p. Even Pascal did not think the considerations of the wager could be efficacious in reasoning about whether God actuallyexists. Consequently, one major challenge for defenders of moral or practical reasons for belief is to explanain how such reasons could possibly work.

I’ll argue that all sides of the debate should deny that only evidence can feature in deliberation about whether p. I model how practical and moral considerations can legitimately feature within deliberation about whether p is true. Two fairly radical upshots. “Transparency” — the phenomenon that deliberation about whether one should believe p is entirely exhausted by deliberation about whether p — turns out to be a non sequitur for reasons for belief. Second, if deliberation about p is a guide to reasons to believe p, evidence cannot be the only reason for belief. I sketch how the evidentialist could modify their position to better capture the spirit of their view, and outline a new way forward for the pragmatist-evidentialist dispute. Both sides should agree that the place to conduct their disagreement is in the normative stratosphere: the structure of deliberation will not help to resolve their dispute.

Please note that these seminars are open to the public and in person only.