Abstract: The usual approach to justifying a logic of indicative conditionals is based on intuitive judgments about valid patterns of inference. I propose a new, pragmatic approach to justification of logic that complements the usual approach. The idea is, first, to identify the roles of acceptance of indicative conditionals in rational decision-making and, then, to determine the logical system(s) of conditionals that we need for fulfilling those roles. I pursue that idea as follows. I assume that it is sometimes rational for us to make a decision in a qualitative manner without the kind of intense deliberation that is required by maximization of subjective expected utility. Our everyday practical reasoning provides such examples: “I have no food in my house; if today is not Sunday then the grocery store is open today; today is not Sunday; so, I should go grocery shopping today rather than not.” To justify Earnest Adams’ logical system of conditionals, I prove two theorems to the following effect. First, a logical system no weaker than Adams’ is necessary in order for everyday practical reasoning to fully implement qualitative decision-making. Second, a logical system no stronger than Adams’ is necessary in order for qualitative decision-making to be as applicable as possible. Those two theorems uniquely pick out Adams’ system as the logical system for extending the set of (non-iterated) indicative conditionals that one accepts for the purposes of qualitative decision-making.