*Note unusal day, time and location*

Philosophers often justify their preoccupation with fully just states of affairs by asserting that such ideals illuminate the complexion of basic moral and social values (e.g., liberty, equality, and so on) and the relationships among them. We show that restricting our analysis to a narrow range of ideal scenarios — in which at best only a very limited set of tradeoffs arise — leaves us with an impoverished understanding of these basic values. We illustrate our point by analyzing cases in which the feasible mechanisms for reducing global inequality risk aggravating domestic inequality. Such cases raise tradeoffs among basic values that the global justice literature has tended to overlook. We show how engaging with the tradeoffs that arise in these nonideal situations is critical for evaluating and clarifying the content of various ideals of global justice.

This talk is part of a joint project with Christian Barry (ANU).