One important proposal about the nature of well-being, prudential value, or the personal good, is that intrinsic values for a person ought to “fit” or “resonate with” the person for whom they are good. References to this the- sis are—or may as well be—countless.  Subjectivists about well-being have marshalled it in favor of their view. Objectivists have gamely attempted to accommodate it—or reject it. But virtually everyone agrees that there is something very plausible about this necessary condition on the building blocks of a good life. Given the importance of this constraint, however, it may come as some- thing of a surprise how little reason we actually have to believe it. In this paper, I’d like to do two things: first, to illustrate just how philosophically tenuous this thesis is, despite its apparent attraction, and to correct, or at least begin to correct, this state of affairs. My argument focuses on what I understand as the general character of the relationship welfare subjects bear to those objects, states of affairs, or events that make up their good—and the ways in which valuing agents can shape that relationship for themselves.