Please note that this talk is moved to Lectorial 1 on the ground floor of the RSSS building.

In my talk, I will introduce the Buddhist epistemological analysis of the liar paradox by situating this analysis in the context of contemporary studies of paradoxes. I will start with defining a paradox and the liar paradox. I will argue that a paradox can be understood in two distinct ways: as an argument (a series or a set of sentences or propositions) or as a piece of reasoning (a process of transitioning cognitive states—for example, beliefs or knowledge). Next, I will argue that what it takes to answer or solve a paradox can be understood in two distinct ways as well: logically (focusing on principles specifying what sentences or propositions semantically or syntactically imply what other sentences or propositions) and epistemologically (focusing on principles of reasoning specifying how one does or ought to form, maintain, and revise their cognitions). I will survey contemporary analyses of the liar paradox and argue that most of these analyses understand the liar paradox to be an argument and propose logical solutions to the paradox. In contrast, the Buddhist analysis of the liar paradox I develop in my thesis understands the liar paradox to be a piece of reasoning and proposes a distinctively epistemological answer to this paradox.