In the second half of "Two Dogmas", Quine argued that there could be empirical grounds to revise logic---at least in principle. Since then, the most (though still not very) popular proposal for what those empirical grounds might actually be has involved quantum mechanics. 

Still, most logicians seem to think that quantum mechanics does not give us good enough reason for revision. This paper considers and evaluates an alternative proposal for what those grounds might look like and the logic they would support: perhaps the experiences acquired in virtual reality give us reason to adopt an assessment-sensitive logic.

Gillian Russell is a professor in the school of philosophy/RSSS at the Australian National University and a visiting Professorial Fellow (1/5th time) in the Arché Research Center at the University of St Andrews in Scotland. Her most recent book is "Barriers to Entailment", about a family of theses that say that you can’t get certain sorts of conclusion from certain sorts of premises, like: you can’t get an ought from an is (Hume’s Law), or you can’t get conclusions about the future from premises about the past, or universal claims from particular ones. 

Other topics she has worked on include the analytic/synthetic distinction and issues in the philosophy of logic, like logic’s epistemology, the normativity of logic, logic and indexicals, logical pluralism, logical nihilism, whether there could be feminist logic etc. She has also written a couple of papers about the philosophy of the martial arts and is also interested in social and political applications of work in both the philosophy of logic and language.