Brian Garrett (ANU): Beyond the Infinite: Bilking, Backwards Causation and Being Itself
Seminar
In this short talk I attempt to spell out clearly the most plausible version of the so-called ‘bilking argument’ against the possibility of backwards causation. The argument is valid but I am critical of its premises. In addition, I gesture towards a positive conception of bilking,…
Restricting Immigration in the Name of Self-Determination
Seminar
Among the arguments made in favour of controlling immigration, there is one that appeals to the self-determination rights of the citizens of the receiving state. The intuitive thought is that in order to be politically self-determining, citizens must be able to decide collectively who joins their…
David Miller (Oxford): Restricting Immigration in the Name of Self-Determination
Seminar
Among the arguments made in favour of controlling immigration, there is one that appeals to the self-determination rights of the citizens of the receiving state. The intuitive thought is that in order to be politically self-determining, citizens must be able to decide collectively who joins their…
Thomas Hurka (Toronto): The Intrinsic Values of Knowledge and Achievement
Seminar
This paper explores the idea that knowledge and achievement are intrinsic human goods -- more specifically, that they’re objective or perfectionist goods, whose value doesn’t depend on our wanting or getting pleasure from them. It discusses what knowledge and achievement are, what makes them…
Chaz Firestone (John Hopkins University): Cognition does not affect perception
Seminar
What determines what we see? A tidal wave of recent research alleges that visual experience is 'penetrated' by higher-level cognitive states such as beliefs, desires, emotions, intentions, and linguistic abilities. There is a growing consensus that such effects are ubiquitous, and even that the…
John Broome (Oxford/ANU): Philosophical Climate Denialism
Seminar
Some people deny that humanity as a whole does harm by its emissions of greenhouse gas. I call these ‘species denialists’. Others deny that individual human beings do harm by their emissions. I call these ‘individual denialists’. Individual denialism is surprisingly popular among moral philosophers…
Stephen Darwall (Yale): What Are Moral Reasons?
Seminar
In The Second-Person Standpoint and subsequent essays, I argue that the deontic moral concepts of obligation, duty, right, wrong, and the like resist analysis in terms of moral reasons for acting. I claim that the “fully deontic” ought of moral obligation has a conceptual connection to…