Abstract: The Problem of Legal Transitions: The Role of Duties to Reform Unjust Laws

Should slave-owners have been compensated upon the abolition of slavery? Should the owners of coal-fired power stations be compensated for the effects of a new carbon tax? When governments change the law, citizens’ plans, investments and other long-term decisions made under the previous law may be affected, causing losses (or gains). The problem of legal transitions is whether to let such losses (and gains) lie where they fall—or whether, for example, to “grandfather” or compensate losers (and/or tax the gains of winners). I argue that citizens’ transitional entitlements (or liabilities) upon a legal change ought to depend in part upon whether they have fulfilled their civic duties to reform unjust laws and establish just ones. Such duties are commonly posited in liberal-egalitarian and critical scholarship (e.g. Rawls’ “natural duty of justice”, and Young’s theory of forward-looking political responsibilities) yet their relevance to the problem of legal transitions has been under-theorised. I will develop a more detailed account of what these duties require of citizens with respect to the reform of unjust laws, and consider the conditions under which their non-fulfilment may be excused. I conclude that the duties are demanding, but more onerous for privileged and highly capable (e.g. wealthy, educated or skilled) citizens. The upshot is that in cases of justice-enhancing reforms, conservative transition policies, such as compensation or grandfathering, will only be justified under certain limited conditions—and more frequently for oppressed and disadvantaged agents than for privileged and highly capable citizens.

Venue: Sir Roland Wilson Building, Room 3.02

Date: Tues 30^th October, 3:30-5:30pm