Expanding the Scope of Human Rights - Suzanne Killmister (Monash)
Seminar
Speaker: Suzanne Killmister Abstract: It is sometimes suggested that human rights ought to be extended to some non-humans – be it non-human animals such as great apes, or forms of artificial intelligence. While such suggestions are typically motivated by a belief that these non-human…
The Skill Model: A Dilemma for Virtue Ethics - Nick Schuster (ANU)
Seminar
Speaker: Nick Schuster Abstract: According to agent-centered virtue ethics, acting well is not a matter of conforming to agent-independent moral standards, like acting so as to respect humanity or maximize utility. Instead, virtuous agents determine what is called for in their…
Humility and Fidelity - Alex Sandgren (Umeå)
Seminar
Speaker: Alex Sandgren Abstract: Following some of David Lewis' later work, I develop and defend a kind of `Ramseyan Humility' thesis according to which the content and truth conditions of representations (beliefs, sentences, models, etc.) are tied to whether roles are occupied rather…
Tamar Schapiro (MIT)
Seminar
Tamar Schapiro (MIT) 12–1PM 9 SEPTEMBER 2022 Location: RSSS room 6.71 or online via this Zoom link Paper title, details for accessing the paper and session details will be circulated through the Philsoc-l mailing list, which you can subscribe to here.
Degrees of Consciousness - Andrew Lee (ANU)
Seminar
Speaker: Andrew Lee Abstract: Is a human more conscious than an octopus? In the science of consciousness, it’s oftentimes assumed that some creatures (or mental states) are more conscious than others. But in recent years, a number of philosophers have argued that the notion of degrees of…
Pre-Submission Talk - Denying Spirits Exist: Epistemic Error Theory and The Self-Undermining Objection
Seminar
Epistemic Error Theory denies that there are epistemic reasons. This theory stands accused of being self-undermining. To accept, assert, argue for, believe, deliberate about, hold that, etc. ‘there are no epistemic reasons’ supposedly implies that there are epistemic reasons; e.g. to argue, the…
Workshop on Neural Representation and Neural Computation
Workshop
How can the firing of neurones help us keep track of the world? Are brains like computers, or is some other metaphor more appropriate? How do neural representations end up “about” something in the world? This two-day workshop, coinciding with Visiting Fellow Nicholas Shea’s residency in the School…