There is a consensus with political science and law that ‘security’ is an essentially contested concept.  This consensus is based upon the diversity of accounts (such as national security, human security, ontological security etc.) which are all said to compete over the proper definition of ‘security’.  This paper examines the claim that security is essentially contested, and argues for a more nuanced view.  I open with a reconsideration of the literature on contested and essentially contestable concepts, hoping to uncover nuance which has yet to be applied to the concepts of security.  I argue that ‘security’ should be understood as a homonym which is used to denote three distinct (though related) concepts: security as a practice (SP), security as a state of being (SB) and security as a relation (SR).  I focus on SB and argue that many purported conceptions of SB (human security, national security etc) should instead be viewed as instances of SB (SB for individuals, SB for states etc.) which do not contest a shared concept.  Instead, I suggest that if there is an essentially contestable component to the word ‘security’ then it is the contest between different conceptions of these instances (national security as territorial integrity, national security as freedom from foreign domination etc.).  Finally, I argue that the ‘common core’ of these instances is the deployment of a shared and uncontested concept of SR.  Relatively little work has been done on describing the concept and value of SR, and I give a preliminary sketch of what such a research agenda would entail.