Some feminists have recently challenged the view that independence is a desirable or possible moral status.  They have also argued against liberal conceptions of citizenship that require citizen autonomy understood as independence.  While these critiques have some merit, I argue that they go too far.  When properly qualified, independence is both possible and desirable.  I argue this point in two different spheres.  First, in the realm of interpersonal relationships, independence (for example, of income and access to sources of information) remains an important means by which women can achieve gender justice.   Second, in the realm of liberal theorizing, autonomy as independence of mind is an important criterion for the choice of political principles.  This latter context, as Eva Kittay argues, does seem to exclude any role for the severely cognitively disabled.  This is a problem that has to be solved even while retaining an emphasis on independence, and I make some suggestions toward this end.