Philosophers often distinguish between imagining things from the inside (or from the first person perspective) and imagining things from the outside (or from the third person perspective). In this talk I construct an understanding of this distinction based on Husserl’s later phenomenological theory of phantasy. In particular, I draw on his account of imagining other mental states, the role of the phantasy-self in imagining and his notion of phantasy self-displacements (Versetzungen). Husserl’s theory is particularly well-suited to account for the distinction in crucial respects, but also suffers from shortcomings, some of which are linked to the phenomenological approach itself.

(image: Putting yourself into somebody else's shoes in imagination)

Alma Barner is a PhD graduate student in the School of Philosophy at ANU. Her research is on theories of imagination in analytic philosophy of mind with a focus on the perspectival nature of imaginings.