In "Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism," Jack Smart showed decisively that Restricted (or Rule-) Utilitarianism was an unstable moral theory, either collapsing into Extreme (or Act-) Utilitarianism or implicitly constituting "a form of superstitious rule-worship."  In other words, he showed that if one is going to be a  Utilitarian, one had better be an Extreme (or Act-) Utilitarian.  This paper argues that the persuasiveness of Smart's argument presupposes a certain way of thinking about morality and its proper role in our lives. If one identifies morality with a moral point of view, which specifies what considerations count as good moral reasons, Smart's argument stands.  But if one thinks of morality as a practice, the theory identified as Rule-Utilitarianism can answer Smart's objections. 

Given the standard understanding of Utilitarianism by moral philosophers today, this conception of Rule-Utilitarianism may not seem like a type of Utilitarianism at all. Still, the theory has a lot going for it, and there is reason to think that a theory of this sort would be welcomed by John Stuart Mill.