Wellbeing as wholeness: Against the instrumental/intrinsic distinction – Mark Fabian
Seminar
The Analytical philosophy of wellbeing standardly distinguishes what is intrinsically wellbeing – what is ‘good for’ somebody or of prudential value to them – from what is instrumental to wellbeing, that is, facilitates one to obtain prudential value.This paper argues that while this distinction is…
On the very idea of a map-like mental representation - Dr Alexandre Duval
Seminar
A core issue in the philosophy of mind is whether the mental representations that make up our thoughts have a language-like or map-like format (or perhaps both). Dr Duval’s talk revisits an argument that seeks to undermine the distinction between the two mental formats by pointing out that, for…
Deliberation and Credence Gaps - Professor Jeremiah Joven Joaquin
Seminar
In ‘Deliberation Welcomes Prediction,’ Alan Hájek raised some concerns about what Isaac Levi has dubbed the Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction thesis (DCOP). DCOP implies that an agent cannot have option-credences on pain of irrationality. Hájek contends that DCOP implies mundane…
Wrongdoing and the Limits of Privacy - Dr Jelena Gligorijevic
Seminar
When does wrongdoing disentitle an individual to his right to privacy? Exactly what amounts to that type of wrongdoing which simply can never be protected by a right to privacy in the first place? Although it is largely accepted that unlawful behaviour should not be conceived of as ‘private’ and…
Doxastic Wronging, Disrespectful Belief and The Moral Over-Demandingness Objection - Stephanie Sheintul
Seminar
Some scholars working on the ethics of belief argue that we can wrong each other in virtue of what we believe. This thesis is known as doxastic wronging. Proponents of doxastic wronging have different views about when our beliefs wrong. A prominent view is that our beliefs wrong when they…
Engineering Ecocide is Morally Wrong - Christopher Lean
Seminar
Recently philosophers have argued that genetically engineering predators to become herbivores is a morally viable option (Bramble 2020; Pearce 2015; McMahan 2015;). Others have argued that high fecundity high mortality life strategies should be engineered into low fecundity low mortality breeding…
A Defense of Statistical and Character Evidence in the Law - Nevin Climenhaga
Seminar
According to legal probabilism, a legal standard of proof (such as “preponderance of evidence” or “beyond a reasonable doubt”) is met just in case the probability of guilt or liability given the evidence is above some threshold. One common objection to legal probabilism is that it wrongly treats “…