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HomeUpcoming EventsQuantifying The Human
Quantifying the Human

Quantitative measurement in the human sciences remains controversial. Are depression scales, intelligence tests, etc. valid measurement instruments? Do they deliver quantitative or merely ordinal information? Cristian discusses two approaches for understanding practices of quantitative measurement of theoretical attributes. One uses causal notions to characterise dispositional attributes and to understand how they relate to measurement indications. 

It aims at standard epistemic desiderata in science (discovery, explanation, prediction) and offers good answers to traditional worries about human attributes (namely, are they really quantitative?) and about their measurement instruments (namely, are they valid?). A second approach uses the notion of value (Hausman 2015) to make sense of quantification practices. 

This approach does not resemble what scientists think of their measurement practices: it is not designed for the testing of tentative concepts but rather to standardise political decision making. Yet, he argues, this approach is the most plausible candidate for making sense of some human sciences’ measurement practices as quantifying anything. Such is the case for measurements that (i) combine distinct dimensions of the phenomena at stake and (ii) for which we don’t observe serious efforts aiming at embedding such measurements in predictive and explanatory networks. 

He illustrates with two examples: depression severity (HAMD) and the Human Development Index (HDI). He closes with tentative ideas on whether fitness—especially survival fitness—may exemplify a third approach for understanding practices of quantification. 

 

Dr Cristian Larroulet Philippi specialises in the philosophy of science, with a particular focus on the philosophy of the social sciences, including economics and aspects of medicine. His PhD dissertation and current research project both examine the challenges associated with quantitative measurement in the social sciences. He has also published work on the role of values in science and on causal methods. Prior to his work in philosophy, Dr. Larroulet studied and conducted research in economics. 

 

Date & time

  • Thu 08 May 2025, 3:30 pm - 5:00 pm

Location

Level 1 Auditorium (1.28), RSSS Building 146 Ellery Cres. Acton 2601, ACT

Speakers

  • Dr Cristian Larroulet Philippi (University of Cambridge)

Event Series

Philosophy Departmental Seminars

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  •  Alexandre Duval
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