A Genealogical Argument for Radical Moral Encroachment - Brandon Yip
Seminar
According to radical moral encroachment, certain moral considerations encroach on epistemic norms to avoid making conflicting demands on agents. In this paper, we provide a genealogical argument for this view by focusing on the kinds of doxastic wrongs that involve forming beliefs based on…
Knowing what to do - Arc Kocurek
Seminar
Much has been written on whether practical knowledge (knowledge-how), i.e., knowledge ascriptions embedding a how-to question, reduces to propositional knowledge (knowledge-that), i.e., knowledge ascriptions embedding a that-clause. Less attention has been paid to knowledge ascriptions embedding…
Assertion Without its Constitutive Norm - Neri Marsili
Seminar
There is philosophical disagreement about which norm regulates assertion. Proponents of factive accounts argue that only true propositions are assertable, whereas proponents of non-factive accounts insist that at least some false propositions are. An alternative solution is to understand truth as…
Cognition on the Edge of Chaos: The Free Energy Principle - Inês Hipólito
Seminar
Cognition stands as one of the most formidable challenges in scientific inquiry. Living organisms exhibit behaviour teetering on the precipice of chaos. The Free Energy Principle (FEP) has been proposed as a pertinent approach to apprehending cognition. Conventional discourse on the FEP…
Mental Simulation and Language Comprehension - Michelle Liu
Seminar
According to the simulation view, language comprehension often constitutively involves perceptual-motor simulations. In this talk, I will survey the empirical evidence for the simulation view. Drawing on recent work on semantic representation, I make suggestions as to how the simulation view can be…
Is Lying Morally Wrong? - Emanuel Viehbahn
Seminar
While few hold that lying is always morally wrong all things considered, many take lying to be pro tanto (or prima facie) morally wrong. This talk will explore whether the view that lying is pro tanto morally wrong can be grounded in features essential to lying. The talk will focus on two features…
Concepts as Regulative Ideals - Laura Schroeter
Seminar
What is it to share the same concept? The question is an important one since sharing the same concept explains our ability to non accidentally coordinate on the same topic over time and between individuals. Moreover, concept identity grounds key logical relations among thought contents such as same…