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Centre for Consciousness

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Centre for Moral, Social and Political Theory

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HomeUpcoming Events21 Mar - TBC
21 Mar - TBC

Photo by Kenny Eliason on Unsplash

Almost all of our reasoning is *defeasible*:  that is, our inferences go through only other things equal, and there are always more of them -- the list of things that might go wrong is open-ended, and doesn't run out.   Most work on defeasibility (or non-monotonic reasoning, if you're in the AI world) is focused on how to *represent* it, but I want to take a step back, and ask why it's *there*. I will argue that defeasible inference is a hard-to-avoid design feature of certain kinds of boundedly rational agents, that the open-endedness is genuine, and that we need to understand defeasibility from an engineering -- rather than a formal -- perspective.

Date & time

  • Tue 21 Mar 2023, 3:00 pm - 4:30 pm

Location

RSSS Building, Room 6.71

Speakers

  • Elijah Millgram

Event Series

Philsoc seminars

Contact

  •  Theo Murray
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