This talk will be about the contents of belief. I will discuss a phenomenon I call ‘conflation’. A theory gives rise to conflation if there are beliefs that ought to be considered distinct but which, according to the offending theory, are the same belief. They do not carve belief contents finely enough. Some well-known theories that have this problem are causal theories (e.g. Donnellan and Kripke), community theories (e.g. Burge), and magnet theories. The fact that they give rise to conflation is, I will argue, reason to reject them.

I will also argue that some broadly Freagean accounts of mental content give rise to conflation. One might have thought Fregeans would be able to carve belief contents finely enough (with the help of senses, concepts or modes of presentation). Unfortunately not so. Some broadly Fregean theories, including Frege's own theory, are plagued by conflation. 

Next there will be a discussion of one crucial motivation we might have for countenancing some conflation. The same features of the offending theories that allow for conflation also give rise to a desirable kind of stability of belief contents, which in turn allows for communication and coordination of belief.

Finally, I will discuss the prospects of responding to the problem by adopting a kind of pluralism about belief contents (e.g. a theory like that of Chalmers). I will argue that, though pluralism is appealing, there are reasons to be cautious about accepting pluralist theories in general and at least one reason to be suspicious of Chalmers’ proposal in particular.