Names are used to pick out objects. For instance, ‘Frank’ picks out a particular object. But what about objects that closely resemble the object picked out by ‘Frank’ but are nonetheless distinct?  Suppose there is another object Frank* which is like Frank in every way except Frank* only exists when Frank is wearing shoes. Which object is picked out by ‘Frank’ will matter to the truth value of simple sentences like ‘Possibly, Frank went barefoot today’. If the utterance ‘Frank’ picks out one and not the other, as it plausibly does, how does this happen?

In this talk I will attempt to clarify the debate surrounding theories of semantic content fixing by supposing that Frank* and other such objects exist and are equally eligible as contents of names and by discussing what consequences follow for theories of semantic content fixing.

I will present what I take to be a dilemma for theories of semantic content fixing that forces semantic theories, on pain of indeterminacy, to either 1. enrich the picture of representational practices such that they rule out the relevant objects or 2. appeal to some sort of privilege among the set of objects themselves that will rule out the relevant objects.