Visual imagination is perspectival. For example, in visualizing a cup on a table, I imagine the cup and the table from a particular visual perspective. This talk focuses on the question whether perspectivity is relevant for the contents of sensory imaginings, and if so, how we can account for it in a centered possible worlds framework. Typically, a centered worlds framework models the contents of mental states using sets of points which are triples, i.e. worlds with a marked individual at a time. The marked individual at a time is generally thought to be necessary to model de se contents.  In this talk I first argue that perspectival contents are distinct from both de se contents and de dicto contents. Second, I argue that even though perspectival contents are distinct from de se contents, marking individuals is sufficient to account for the perspectival content of the imagining in a lot of cases. But there is an important class of imaginings for which this is not the case. The conclusion of the talk is that an adequate account of the contents of imaginings uses centers marking perspectives in addition to individuals.