This paper identifies and explains a distinction between two views about whether the Liberal state may legally restrict conduct on account of its mere offensiveness: Hard-nosed Liberalism, which rejects offense-based restrictions on conduct in principle, and Balancing Liberalism, which accepts such restrictions in principle. The paper surveys the bases of the dispute between these two Liberal views of offense, clarifying other important issues in this arena along the way, including (i) the difference between unmediated (i.e. ‘raw’) offense and belief-mediated resentment or indignation; and (ii) the distinction between upstream (i.e. proactive/preventive) approaches, and downstream (i.e. reactive/punitive) approaches to reducing the incidence of offensive conduct. It then explains why Balancing Liberals, who accept the justifiability of legal restrictions on offensive conduct in principle, may nevertheless have good reasons to eschew such restrictions in view of their wider social consequences.