It seems a sensible platitude that prudence commands equal treatment of one’s present and future self (or selves).  The temporal location of a particular present or future benefit, in other words, does not affect the strength of the prudential reason to bring that benefit about.  But what does prudence command when it comes to past benefits?  This question may seem moot: after all, it’s not possible to benefit oneself in the past, and hence there can be no prudential reasons to do so.  But this, or so I argue, is mistaken.  I argue that there are, in fact, two ways to make oneself better-off in the past, and hence any theory of prudential rationality must grapple with this possibility, and the possibility of trade-offs between past benefits and benefits for one’s present and future.  I then argue that no univocal account of prudential reasons can adequately address the possibility of past benefits.  Instead, I propose a hybrid approach according to which pure temporal neutrality is commanded for some significant welfare benefits, while a bias toward the present and future is appropriate for others.