After Antigone’s brother Polynices was killed, Creon—the king of Thebes— forbade anyone to bury him on pain of death. A fellow Thebian might say:

1. Polynices is unburied.
2. Antigone ought to bury Polynices.

Intuitively, the first claim is descriptive, while the second claim is normative. Expressivists posit that there is a deep difference between the meaning of de- scriptive and normative claims. We understand both in terms of the mental states they conventionally express in sincere speech acts. However, the former express cognitive states: perhaps (1) expresses a belief that Polynices is un- buried, so we understand the meaning of (1) in terms of this belief. By contrast, the latter express conative states: perhaps (2) expresses a plan for Antigone to bury Polynices, so we understand the meaning of (2) in terms of this plan.

What should expressivists say about varieties of normativity? Antigone says:
3. Morally, I ought to bury Polynices. 4. Legally, I ought not bury Polynices.
Creon disagrees with (3) but agrees with (4), so he claims:
5. Morally and legally, Antigone ought not bury Polynices.
Intuitively, (3) is a moral claim, (4) is a legal claim, and (5) is a mixed claim: a claim that is both moral and legal. These varieties of normative claims pose a challenge to expressivism that can be framed as a dilemma: Do (2)–(5) express the same type of conative attitude? Does each claim express (say) plans?

If so, expressivism has implausible commitments regarding inconsistency. The expressivist struggles to explain how the attitudes expressed by (3) and (5) are inconsistent, while the attitudes expressed by (3) and (4) are consistent.

If not, expressivism has implausible commitments regarding meaning. We must understand the meaning of “ought” differently in (2)–(5). This makes expressivism less parsimonious than its well-developed competitors. Worse, it forces the expressivist to posit that there are two different ways to understand the meaning of one use of “ought” in mixed claims, such as (5).

This paper explores both horns of the dilemma, arguing that no variety of expressivism that vindicates any anti-realist ambitions can emerge unscathed.