Abstract: In the contemporary literature on paternalism, it is often assumed that one cannot act paternalistically in rationally persuading someone to do something. Against this assumption, I argue that it is possible to rationally persuade someone to do something, yet treat her paternalistically. My approach begins by clarifying why paternalism matters to us in familiar interpersonal cases. I then suggest that some cases involving rational persuasion should also matter to us in a relevantly similar way. Rational persuasion may be paternalistic when motivated by distrust in the target’s capacity to adequately recognize or weigh reasons and evidence that bear on her good.  Sometimes, the provision of reasons can convey insult and be objectionably intrusive, conflicting with respect for a person’s agency and autonomy. Within this discussion, I also reflect more generally on the borderline between respectful and disrespectful persuasion, attempting to identify some factors that make the provision of reasons disrespectful when it is disrespectful.