This paper defends a new counterfactual conditional account of the
personal good of opportunity. Section I provides case based support
for this account. In Section II I use Lewis’s counterpart theory to
precisely state my view about the pro-tanto personal value of
opportunities. In Section III I argue that prominent accounts of
personal well-being cannot give a completely non-instrumental
explanation of the value of opportunities. This lends support to
well-being pluralism, the view that there is more than one type of
non-instrumental personal good. In Section IV I argue that there are
four factors that affect the non-instrumental value of opportunities.
In Section V I offer an account of the disvalue of risks that is
analogous to the view presented in Section II. In Section VI I
distinguish my view from views offered by Bentham, Finkelstein,
Griffin, Pettit & Sen. When these views offer competing accounts to
mine, I highlight the philosophical advantages of my view. Finally,
if there is sufficient time, I will discuss potential implications for tort and criminal law.