Many philosophical disputes have at some point by someone been diagnosed as merely verbal, for example, disputes over whether there are tables or disputes over whether we have free will. Roughly, a dispute is merely verbal when it arises due to a confusion of some sort over an expression used in the dispute such that parties do not actually disagree, but merely appear to be disagreeing. Merely verbal disputes are in some sense pointless; we should either abandon them or focus on the issues in the vicinity that we actually disagree on. The discussion so far has focused on explaining the linguistic confusion that gives rise to verbal disputes. In my talk, I argue that extant accounts (Balcerak Jackson, Chalmers, Hirsch, Sider) do not satisfactorily explain the other – in my view more important – core feature of verbal disputes: the lack of genuine disagreement. I propose a more promising way to explain the lack of disagreement that also sheds light on the linguistic confusion involved.