Abstract:
One criticism of Strawsonian accounts of moral responsibility is that they collapse together the moral responsibility practices of a moral community with what it means to be morally responsible. In doing so, they limit the possibility for critical engagement with, and reformation of, problematic practices. One concern is that biased responsibility practices that impact on members of marginalized groups while truly reflecting the shared norms of the moral community within which they live may be immune to criticism under these accounts.

Strawson responded to this sort of concern first with a claim that there is no possibility of criticizing and reforming our practices from 'outside', and second, that there is scope to criticize and change practices 'from within'. His response is regarded as unsatisfactory both because those within a moral community may be unable to recognize systematic biases in their practices; and because change would not be required unless the systematic biases were inconsistent with the community's existing moral responsibility practices.

In this paper my aim is to explore more deeply and precisely the limits of criticism and reformation of our moral responsibility practices 'from within'. This requires, first, a clearer notion of what a 'moral community' is, and what is 'inside' as opposed to 'outside' it. And, second, a strategy for identifying and prioritizing the principles that are implicit in a community's moral responsibility practices. Finally, I ask whether a moral community's most general, meta-level commitments, such as a commitment to the idea that their practices are fair, can be grounds for an effective criticism of more specific practices that reflect bias. Can such general principles in fact be extracted from the moral  responsibility practices of a community, and if so are they  substantive enough to engage critically with the treatment of individuals from marginalized groups in a way that does not seem ad hoc?