Speaker:  Eleanora Cresto

In this talk I discuss the epistemic status of algorithmic predictions in the legal realm. I make two main claims. My first claim is that algorithmic predictions do not give us knowledge – not even probabilistic knowledge. The situation, however, is relevantly different from the one we find in the assessment of statistical evidence in general, or the one associated with profiling, and it is rather related to the concept of algorithmic fairness. I argue in this respect that algorithmic fairness in legal contexts is essentially undetermined. My second claim is a bit more optimistic: although we cannot aspire to knowledge, we can have justified credences associated with algorithmic predictions. I connect this claim with the epistemic position I’ve previously dubbed “Moderate Peirceanim”. I end by drawing some morals on the Knowledge Norm for action.

Please note that these seminars are open to the public and in person only.