This paper addresses the topic of fairness and its role in priority-setting in health care.  I begin by noting that fairness is only one of a number of important considerations that are relevant for priority-setting in health care.  I then distinguish between a number of different fairness considerations, each of which might be relevant for priority-setting, and articulate a particular conception of fairness that I shall focus on, which I call comparative fairness.  I then discuss the question of whether we should be concerned about fairness of prospects or fairness of outcomes, linking this discussion to questions about ex ante versus ex post fairness, as well as procedural versus substantive fairness.  I argue for the importance of each of these components of fairness, and discuss various connections between them.  In addition, I discuss the relation between comparative fairness, free will, luck, and responsibility.  I reject the brute luck/option luck distinction as that is often understood, and conclude by suggesting some of the possible implications of my discussion for public policy regarding priority setting in health care.  Although I frame my discussion in terms of priority-setting in health care, its implications extend well beyond that domain, both theoretically and practically.

*Note unusual location: Seminar Room A*