How should a rational agent respond to a disagreement with an epistemic peer? One of the most popular answers to this question is the Equal Weight View (EWV): the rational agent should assign her peer equal weight. However, even those who reject EWV tend to endorse some form of conciliationism: that the rational agent should assign her peer some positive weight or other. Shogenji, among others, have shown that EWV is at odds with the rule of updating by conditionalisation (COND). Shogenji goes one step further, claiming that the same argument establishes that no version of conciliationism is compatible with COND. In this talk I consider two responses on behalf of EWV. While neither response gets EWV off the hook, they are dialectically important for showing why the objection cannot be generalised against conciliationism. Reconciling conciliationism with conditionalisation will reveal a hitherto unnoticed consequence of the view: learning ordinary empirical facts has evidential bearing on what the evidential relations happen to be. I will touch on, but leave unsettled, whether this is a feature or a bug.