The consensus against species having intrinsic essences has recently been challenged. The challengers have taken some account of criticisms of this essentialism, but they have not fully engaged with a range of criticisms, particularly those of Dupré, stemming from views of the metaphysics of essences in general. In his seminar, Professor Michael Devitt argues that these views are largely mistaken. 

All kinds have essences which may be intrinsic, relational, or partly both. Essences are interesting because they are “super-explanatory”, explaining the kind’s place in the causal nexus. The case for species essentialism rests on this metaphysics of essences. Dupré’s metaphysics wrongly takes the following to count against essentialism: that species should be conceived of as individuals, not kinds; a kind’s lack of sharp boundaries; variation and change in a kind; taxonomic pluralism. Finally, contra Dupré, classification in science, including biology, is of kinds with explanatory essences that it is the business of science to investigate.

Professor Michael Devitt is Distinguished Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at The Graduate Center at The City University of New York and a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Humanities. He is famous for his work in philosophy of language and linguistics, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, philosophy of science, and epistemology.