Rational requirements such as the Instrumental Requirement and the Enkratic Requirement raise a problem. It seems to be the case that (1) rational requirements are genuinely normative. On the other hand, there are compelling grounds for thinking that (2) it is not the case that rational requirements entail normative reasons to comply with them. Yet it seems that (1) and (2) cannot both be true. It is commonly taken to be a philosophical truism about normativity that (3) a requirement R is genuinely normative if and only if R entails normative reasons to comply with R. Given (3), (1) entails that (2) is false, and (2) entails that (1) is false. I call this ‘the Problem of Rationality’. Most philosophers have responded to the Problem of Rationality by giving up on either (1) or (2). I suggest that we should instead give up on the so-called truism about normativity, namely, (3). Rational requirements are genuinely normative, but their normativity isn’t the normativity of reasons. To explicate the normativity of rational requirements, I suggest that we expand our conception of the normative to include what I call ‘to-do-makers’. Whereas practical reasons are ought-makers – considerations that help determine what we ought to do – to-do-makers are considerations that help determine what to do. More precisely, they are considerations that help determine the correct answer to the question of what to do, which, following Pamela Hieronymi, I suggest is crucially different from the question of what one ought to do. I conjecture that practical rational requirements are normative inasmuch as they entail to-do-makers. I conclude by considering what the account implies for the relation between reasons and to-do-makers, and the prospects for extending the account to cover theoretical rational requirements.